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Abstract
It is well-known that the affective value of an environment can be relative to whether it reflects an improvement or a
worsening from a previous state. A potential explanation for this phenomenon suggests that relative changes from previous
reward contingencies can constrain how brain monitoring systems form predictions about future events. In support of this
idea, we found that changes per se relative to previous states of learned reward contingencies modulated the Feedback-
Related Negativity (FRN), a human brain potential known to index discrepancies between predictions and affective
outcomes. Specifically, we observed that environments with a 50% reward probability yielded different FRN patterns
according to whether they reflected an improvement or a worsening from a previous environment. Further, we also found
that this pattern of results was driven mainly by variations in the amplitude of ERPs to positive outcomes. Overall, these
results suggest that relative changes in reward probability from previous learned environments can constrain how neural
systems of outcome monitoring formulate predictions about the likelihood of future rewards and nonrewards.
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Introduction
After a long period of unemployment, the event of being offered
a job with an average salary is almost always positively evaluated.
This event can certainly lead to an upwards revision of a series of
expectations (e.g. better house, better car, better holidays, family
planning, etc.). In contrast, a high earner who has to change jobs
and accept the same average salary job would instead have to
revise downwards his/her expectations (e.g. smaller house,
cheaper holidays, etc.). This trivial example illustrates a funda-
mental dimension of human cognition: the same objective event
can be at the origin of radically different expectations if it
represents a change from different prior circumstances. It is
important to emphasize that the absolute value of the new
situation (e.g. an average salary job) often has little relevance.
What matters in this case is the change relative to a previous
situation (an improvement or a worsening in overall expectations). This
phenomenon is frequent in everyday life and can potentially be
linked to psychopathological states linked to sudden changes in life
circumstances [1–3].
A mechanistic explanation for this phenomenon could be
inspired from reinforcement learning and conflict monitoring
models [4,5]. According to these models, the human brain keeps
track of previous experiences (and in particular of instances of
positive and negative reinforcements) in order to formulate
predictions about incoming events. The accuracy of these
predictions is measured by monitoring processes which are widely
thought to rely on the medial frontal cortex, and in particular the
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). If an event does not fit the
predictions of the system, then a discrepancy signal, often called a
reward prediction error (RPE), is produced and can be used to
adjust future predictions [4,6]. From this theoretical approach, it
could be hypothesized that relative changes per se in the frequency
of rewarding events could constrain how monitoring systems
formulate predictions about incoming events. For instance, an
environment characterised by a dynamic increase in reward
probability relative to a previous environment could lead to the
prediction that rewards will become more frequent. Consequently,
the occurrence of nonrewards could reflect deviations from this
expectation. Conversely, a relative decrease in rewards could lead to
the expectation of a growing number of nonrewards, which would
cause rewards to be perceived as prediction errors. Stated
differently, relative changes from prior environments could
determine how much an event deviates from ongoing predictions,
above and beyond the absolute value of this event. These
hypotheses would be consistent with theories emphasizing the
role of contextual factors in the detection of prediction errors [7,8].
For instance, Bar [7,9] suggests that a context created by top-down
memory representations can be the main determinant of whether
an event is appraised as a prediction error, and consequently if this
event will attract attentional resources or not. Applied to the case
described above, it could be speculated that a change in reward
probability could in itself form a context that determines if a
(non)reward is a significant prediction error or not. These
predictions would also be consistent with fMRI studies showing
that medial frontal areas are sensitive to relative changes in reward
contingencies (48–50) and with studies suggesting that RPE indices
can be sensitive to context effects over and above absolute reward
values [10,11].
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The Feedback-related Negativity (FRN) provides an opportu-
nity to test these ideas. The FRN is a scalp event-related potential
(ERP) time-locked to the delivery of decision outcomes, and it is
characterised by a larger negative-going deflection for non-
rewards compared to rewards [12]. Evidence indicates that the
FRN is linked to activity in medial frontal areas, and in particular
the ACC [13–15]. This distinction between ERPs to positive and
negative outcomes is now perceived as reflecting a fundamental
ability to differentiate between valenced outcomes and has become
the object of intense investigation [12,16–23]. An important
characteristic of the FRN is its sensitivity to the unexpectedness of
an outcome [21,22]. In particular, many studies found that FRNs
were larger for unexpected than expected negative outcomes
(when outcomes are ‘‘worse than expected’’) [24,25]. Several
studies show that this pattern is obtained for negative but not for
positive outcomes, for which the effects of unexpectedness can
often follow a different polarity (i.e. more ERP positivity for
unexpected rewards in the FRN time window) [21,22]. These
results are consistent with the theoretical model most frequently
used to explain FRN effects (the ‘‘reinforcement learning theory of
the error related negativity’’, or RL-ERN) which posits that the
FRN is an index of negative RPE [4]. However, a growing
number of studies indicate that the sensitivity of the FRN to
unexpectedness does not always vary according to the valence of
the outcome [26–30]. These results would be more consistent with
a recent model that suggests that the FRN reflects the activity of a
valence-independent system of detection of expectancy violations
[31]. Despite this ongoing debate, there seems to be a consensus
that the FRN indexes deviations from learned predictions [18].
Therefore, the main goal of the present study was to use the
FRN in order to examine whether RPEs can be constrained by a
change per se relative to a previous state of reward contingencies.
Specifically, we predicted that environments with a constant 50%
reward probability would yield different FRN patterns according
to whether these environments correspond to an increase or a
decrease in reward probability relative to a previous context. To
test this hypothesis, this study used a gambling task where
participants were delivered a series of feedbacks reflecting financial
gains or losses (see Figure 1). More specifically, participants had to
perform a forced two-choice decision task followed by a financial
gain or loss over the course of several trials. The experimental
trials were divided in four blocked conditions (each containing 32
trials) across which the reward probability was manipulated: the
‘‘Win Domain’’ (WD), the ‘‘Loss Domain’’ (LD), the ‘‘Post-Win
Domain’’ (PW) and the ‘‘Post-Loss Domain’’ (PL). In WD, 80% of
the trials led to a financial gain. In LD, 80% of the trials led to a
financial loss. Crucially, these two conditions were each followed
by a context in which the relative proportions of gains and losses
were equal (50%): the PL and the PW blocks (more specific details
are described in the Procedure section, and in Figures 1 and 2).
We hypothesized that WD and PL would both be characterized by
positive expectations. In other words, WD and PL would be
contexts in which rewards are expected, and nonrewards are
unexpected. These putative expectations would be induced either
in an ‘‘objective’’ manner for WD (i.e. through the manipulation
of reward/nonreward frequencies) or ‘‘subjective’’ in the case of
PL (i.e. through the improvement in reward probability relative to the
previous block). Conversely, we expected LD and PW to be
contexts characterized by negative expectations induced either by a
low frequency of rewards (LD) or by a worsening relative to the
previous block (PW).
Given that many FRN studies seem to report a valence
asymmetry in FRN effects consistent with the RL-ERN account
(i.e. the FRN is larger when outcomes are worse than expected; see
[21] for a review), we predicted that the effect of valence on the
FRN should be reliable when expectations are positive (negative
feedbacks are unexpected) and it should be smaller or null when
expectations are negative [32,33]. Therefore, the effect of valence
on the FRN should be robust for both WD and PL, but smaller or
null for LD and PW. Crucially, if a change per se relative to a
previous state of reward probability is sufficient to modulate
outcome monitoring systems, then there should be no difference
between expectations induced by ‘‘objective’’ vs. ‘‘subjective’’
methods. Specifically, the behaviour of the FRN should be similar
between WD and PL, and between LD and PW. Finally, the
gambling task used in the present study also required participants
to choose between two possible options: a ‘‘risky’’ option for which
the magnitude of both positive and negative outcomes was in
average larger than a ‘‘safe’’ option (see Procedure and Design
section). This approach enabled us to control for the type of
behavioural choice preceding the outcome, a variable that can
sometimes modulate the FRN [34] and which is often not
explicitly controlled for.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Thirty right-handed healthy participants (17 males; mean
age = 22.87 years, SD = 4.67) with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and with no history of psychiatric or neurological conditions
participated in this study. Six participants were excluded because
of excessive EEG artifacts leading to less than 16 artifact-free trials
for at least one of the relevant experimental conditions. Two
participants were removed because they were behavioural outliers.
Behavioural outliers were defined as participants who displayed
choice behaviour rates that were more than 1.5 interquartile
ranges below the lower quartile in any relevant experimental
block, as recommended by Tukey [35]. All analyses were
performed on the resulting sample of 22 participants (12 males,
mean age = 23.68 years, SD = 5.2). All participants signed an
informed consent and the study was approved by the Ethics
Effects of Reward Probability Changes on the FRN
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Figure 1. Task procedure. Each trial started with a fixation
cross (750 ms) followed by the presentation of a screen including 
acircle  and  a square  (one  shape  coloured  yellow  and the 
otherpurple)  representing either  a  risky  or  safe  choice.
Participantsmade a selection between a risky and safe choice
using  akeypress. Next, another fixation screen was displayed and
followedby a screen providing a feedback (1000 ms) detailing
whetherparticipants had won or lost points in the trial. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066350.g001
Committee of the Institute of Psychological Sciences at the
University of Leeds.
Procedure and Design
The experiment took place in a quiet room with lights dimmed.
After the setup of the EEG electrode net, participants were invited
to sit comfortably at approximately 50 cm away from a computer
screen and were instructed to position their right hand on a
stimulus response pad (Psychology Software Tools Serial Response
Box, Pittsburgh, PA). The experiment was displayed on a 170 Dell
monitor, with a screen resolution of 128061024 and refresh rate
of 60 Hz, and controlled by E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools,
Pittsburgh, PA). Prior to the experiment, participants were told
that they would take part in a gambling experiment in which they
could successively choose a ‘‘risky’’ or a ‘‘safe’’ choice that would
be followed by gains or losses of points relative to an initial lump
amount of 1000 points. They were also told that at the end of the
experiment, the final amount of points would be translated into an
actual sum of money of up to £10. As depicted in Figure 1, on
each trial, participants were first shown a fixation cross during
750 ms. Next, participants were shown a screen displaying two
shapes; a circle and square (1500 ms), with one shape coloured
yellow and the other purple. Each of the two colours was linked to
either a risky or a safe choice. Participants were explicitly told
before the experiment which of the two colours was linked to a
risky or safe choice. The association between coloured shapes and
response type (risky vs. safe) was counterbalanced across partic-
ipants. Choosing a risky option would lead to a relatively large
amount of points (a randomised amount between 5 and 9 points)
gained or lost, whereas a safe choice would lead to a relatively low
amount (a randomised amount of points between 1 and 4) of
points won or lost. As soon as the coloured shapes appeared on
screen, participants had to choose between these two options with
a keypress. In order to minimise strategic no-responses, if no key
was pressed 1500 ms after the onset of the screen presenting
coloured shapes, a randomised amount between 1 and 9 points
was deducted from the total score. After choice selection, a fixation
cross (750 ms) preceded the feedback presentation stimuli, which
appeared on the screen for 1000 ms. The feedback screen
provided information about the valence of the feedback (‘‘You
Win!’’ or ‘‘You Lose!’’), a plus or minus signal to indicate reward
or punishment and the amount of points to be added or subtracted
from the total score.
Each participant was presented with a total of 448 trials. These
trials were separated into 14 blocks, each containing 32 trials for
an experiment that lasted approximately 70 minutes. As explained
in the introduction,there were four main types of blocks: Win
Domain (WD), Loss Domain (LD), Post-Win domain (PW) and
Post-Loss domain (PL). In WD, most of the outcomes (80%)
reflected financial gains and in LD, most of the outcomes (80%)
were losses. These two contexts were each followed by a context in
which the relative proportions of gains and losses were equal
(50%): the PL and the PW domain. In addition to these four block
types, ‘‘Neutral’’ blocks appeared twice in the experiment after a
50% reward probability block. The Neutral blocks also had a 50%
reward probability and were included in order to minimize the
expectations that win or loss block would necessarily appear after a
PW or PL block. Each participant was therefore presented with a
randomised sequence of three WD-PW block pairs, three LD-PL
block pairs and two neutral blocks, for a total of 14 blocks with 32
trials for each block. Before the experiment, participants
performed 8 practice trials in order to familiarize with the
procedure.
Electrophysiological Data Recording and Analysis
EEG was recorded with a 128-channel net connected to a high-
input amplifier (Electrical Geodesics, Inc., Eugene, OR) at a rate
of 500 Hz (0.01–200 Hz bandwidth). All electrodes had an
impedance below 50 kV. However, the impedance was lowered
at or below 20 kV for those electrode sites likely to be included in
our analyses (including all the electrodes belonging to the clusters
described in Figure 3d and 4c). EEG data were recorded using a
Cz reference, and digitally converted to an average mastoids
reference. EEG data were analysed using the ERP module of
BESA 5.1 (MEGIS Software GmbH, Gra¨felfing, Germany). EEG
data were further filtered offline (0.1–30 Hz bandwith) and
segmented into epochs of 0–1000 ms time-locked to the onset of
the ‘‘win’’ or ‘‘lose’’ feedback (with an additional 200 ms pre-
stimulus baseline). Eye movement artifacts were corrected using a
multiple source analysis method [36,37] as implemented in BESA
5.1 (‘‘surrogate method’’). In addition, for each channel, epochs
with a difference between the maximum and minimum voltage
Effects of Reward Probability Changes on the FRN
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Figure 2. Example of a sequence of experimental blocks for one participant. In total, participants encountered 14 blocks with 32 trials
each. Thereward probability was manipulated within each block. The Win Domain (WD) block had a reward probability of 80% and the
Loss Domain (LD) had a 20% reward probability. Blocks with a 50% reward probability followed WD and LD: Post-loss (PL) blocks always
followed LD andPost-Win (PW) blocks always followed WD. The neutral blocks, which also had a reward probability of 50% did not
represent a change in reward expectancy and were included in order to minimize the expectations that WD or LD blocks would necessarily
appear after PW or PLblocks. A randomised sequence of three WD-PW block pairs, three LD-PL block pairs and two neutral blocks
were presented to eachparticipant.doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066350.g002
amplitude.120 mV and a maximum difference between two
adjacent voltage points.75 mV were rejected (after eye movement
artifact correction). ERP waveforms were first created through
averaging baseline-corrected EEG data epochs for eight trial types
corresponding to ‘‘Win’’ and ‘‘Lose’’ feedbacks for the 4 block
types (WD, LD, PW, PL). An average of 44 artifact-free trials by
condition was attained, and participants with less than 16 artifact-
free trials in any relevant condition were excluded from the sample
(see Participants section).
Following our hypotheses, data analyses focused mainly on the
Feedback-related Negativity (FRN). As the FRN is usually
observed mainly in midline fronto-central sites [10,38], we focused
on this location for our analyses, following standard practice
[12,16,26,28,39]. We formed a cluster in which we averaged
electrode data from a group of midline electrodes surrounding the
standard FCz location (EGI electrode numbers: ‘129, ‘59, ‘69, ‘139,
‘1129, ‘79, ‘1069, ‘Cz9, ‘319, ‘809 and ‘559, see Figure 3d). This
approach is consistent with common practice in high-density EEG
research according to which pooling single electrode data in
clusters improves the stability of ERP data and attenuates
familywise statistical errors [40]. Analyses on the FRN focused
on negative peak amplitudes extracted from the fronto-central
cluster in a 250–350 ms time window, consistent with previous
literature [41–43]. In order to further verify the robustness of our
FRN results, we also computed our analyses on mean amplitudes
and peak-to-peak amplitudes. Peak-to-peak amplitudes were
computed by subtracting the positive peak in the 150–250 ms
time window from the negative peak in the 250–350 ms window.
In order to check if our results were not due to the utilization of a
cluster of electrodes rather than single electrodes, we verified that
similar results were obtained using a single electrode approach
which is often used in FRN studies.In particular, we observed a
similar Feedback X EVal interaction (p= .006) on FRN data using
single electrode e6, which approximates the FCz standard
location.
In addition to the FRN, we examined the Feedback-related P3,
a component also known to be sensitive to decision outcomes. Its
precise functional meaning is still unclear, but evidence suggests
that it may be sensitive to outcome valence, magnitude and
expectancy [12,26,44,45]. We did not have a priori hypotheses
regarding this component, but we also examined it in order to
allow comparisons with previous research. As the Feedback-
related P3 is usually measured in posterior sites [12], we created a
midline parietal cluster surrounding the standard Pz location (EGI
electrode numbers: ’619, ‘789, ‘629, ‘679,‘729,‘779, ‘719 and ‘769, see
Figure 4c). Given that amplitude differences at the onset of the P3
(around the N200) were visible, absolute peak and mean
amplitudes might have been biased and thus we focused only on
peak-to-peak measures. Peak-to-peak amplitudes were obtained by
subtracting negative peak amplitudes from a 250–350 ms time
window from the positive peak amplitude obtained from the 350–
500 ms time window.
The choice of the electrode locations and time windows for both
the FRN and Feedback-related P3 was guided by previous
literature [16,18,38,46,47] and by a careful inspection of our
waveforms. A Feedback (win vs. loss) X EVal (Expectation
Effects of Reward Probability Changes on the FRN
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Figure 3. FRN data. Figure 3a. Averaged ERP waveforms for the Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) plotting ERPs to Wins and Losses
separately for the four experimental conditions. A 1–12 Hz bandwith was applied for presentational purposes. Figure 3b. Valence-specific
comparisons of  peak-to-peak  amplitudes  (in  μV)  between  positive  and  negative  expectancy  contexts,  separately  for  ERPs  to  Wins  and 
Losses.  Error bars represent one standard error from the mean. * p-value < .05.  Figure  3c.  Topographical  maps  plotting  difference  scores 
between Loss minus Win ERPs (peak to peak amplitudes) between 250 and 350 ms (maxima: +1.0 μV, minima: -3.5 μV). Figure 3d. Scalp 
location of cluster of electrodes used to quantify the FRN. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066350.g003
valence: positive vs. negative) X EType (Expectation type:
subjective vs. objective) repeated measures ANOVA was comput-
ed for both the FRN and the P3. A ‘‘positive’’ expectation valence
referred to contexts in which we assumed that positive outcomes
would be expected, and negative outcomes unexpected (WD and
PL). ‘‘Negative’’ expectation contexts would have the opposite
characteristics (LD and PW). ‘‘Objective’’ expectations refer to
manipulations of reward frequencies in the current block (WD and
LD) whereas ‘‘subjective’’ expectations refer to manipulations
relative to the previous block (PL and PW). Given that our
hypotheses focused on the well known electrophysiological
distinction between negative and positive feedback, we report
only statistical effects involving the Feedback factor. Significant
interaction terms were followed up by pairwise comparisons
between Win and Loss ERPs. ANOVAs were computed with the
Greenhouse-Geisser correction where relevant to ensure that
results are not biased by potential violations of sphericity. We
consider statistical effects to be reliable at p#0.05, and we also
report the partial eta-squared measure of effect size where
relevant.
We also performed a number of additional analyses: first, we
examined whether the type of behavioural choice (risky vs. safe)
had any effect on the FRN and P3. Second, we examined if our
effects on the FRN were modulated by individual differences in
risk-taking. Third, we examined if our results were different
according to different temporal stages within each block of trials.
The outcomes of these analyses did not modify the main
conclusions of this study. However, for completeness, we report
these analyses in detail in the supplementary sections (specifically,
see Results S2, Figure S1, Figure S2, Results S3, Table S3, Figure
S3, Figure S4; Results S4, Figure S5 and Figure S6).
Results
Behavioural Results
Given that behavioural responses (risky vs. safe choices) were
not predictive of feedback outcome, the type of behavioural choice
preceding feedback cannot be considered as a meaningful
behavioural correlate of the FRN. We have nonetheless analyzed
this behavioural data for the sake of completeness and in order to
assess whether the context manipulation had affected the type of
behavioural choice (risky vs. safe). We analysed response frequency
and response time (RT) using an EVal X EType X Choice
repeated measures ANOVA. The RT data revealed a marginally
significant main effect of EVal (F(1,21) = 4.1, p = .056, g2 = .16),
reflecting faster responses for negative expectancy valence blocks
(M= 547, SE= 23.7) compared to positive expectancy valence
blocks (M= 562, SE= 24.7). This is consistent with previous
research demonstrating faster responses for aversive stimuli [48]
and negative affective states [49,50]. No other significant effect
was found. Analyses on choice frequency revealed no significant
variations in the choice of risky/safe options across blocks.
Specifically, there was no effect of Choice (F(1,21) = 1.2,
p = .285, g2 = .05), no EType X Choice interaction (F(1,21) = 1.5,
Effects of Reward Probability Changes on the FRN
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Figure 4. P3 data. Figure 4a. Averaged ERP waveforms for the Feedback-related P3 plotting ERPs to Wins and Losses separately
for  the four  experimental  conditions.  Figure  4b.  Topographical  maps  plotting  difference scores between peak-to-peak amplitudes of Win
minus Loss  ERPs between 350 and 500 ms (maxima: +4.0 μV, minima:-2.5 μV). Figure 4c. Scalp location of cluster of electrodes used to 
quantify the P3. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066350.g005
p = .23, g2 = .07), no EVal x Choice (F(1,21) = 1.0, p = .32, g2 = .05)
and no EVal X EType X Choice (F(1,21) = .11, p = .74, g2 = .005)
interactions. Descriptive statistics of these analyses can be found in
Results S1, Table S1 and Table S2.
FRN
Consistent with our predictions, a sizeable differentiation
between ERPs to wins and losses was found in WD and PL, but
not in LD and PW blocks (see Figure 3a). Consistent with
previous research [25], scalp maps show that the distribution of
this effect is widely distributed across the scalp and clearly
includes fronto-central sites (Figure 3c). Statistical analyses on
peak amplitudes obtained from the Fronto-Central cluster
revealed a robust EVal X Feedback interaction (F(1, 21) = 9.0,
p = .007, g2 = .30). This interaction was driven by a significant
effect of Feedback for positive expectations (F(1, 21) = 8.5,
p = .008, g2 = .29), while this effect was not significant for
negative expectations (F,1). The EVal X Feedback X EType
interaction was not significant (F,1), indicating that the
interaction between valence and expectation was not modulated
by how expectations were manipulated (objective or subjective).
We repeated this analysis using mean amplitudes and peak-to-
peak measures, and the same EVal X Feedback interaction was
found for both measures (Fs.4.8, ps,.04), and these interac-
tions were also driven by an effect of Feedback in positive
expectation contexts specifically (ps,.003). In these cases, EType
also failed to modulate the Feedback X Expectation interaction.
In summary, these results indicate that a robust electrophysi-
ological differentiation between rewards and nonrewards was
observed in contexts thought to convey positive expectations
(WD and PL) but not in contexts characterised by negative
expectations (LD and PW). In addition, these findings did not
differ according to the method used to induce expectations
(manipulation of the reward probability of the current block or
a change relative to the previous block).
Although the classical FRN effect involves assessing the
difference in amplitude between ERPs to negative and positive
feedbacks, a growing number of studies have recently suggested
that variations in FRN effects might often be driven by
differences specific to ERPs to reward related feedback
[28,29,51–54]. In order to examine this question in our data,
we re-analyzed our data breaking down the reported EVal X
Feedback interaction by feedback type (Win or Loss). For peak
amplitudes, we found a highly significant effect of EVal (F(1,
21) = 15.4, p = .007, g2 = .42) for Win ERPs, but not for Loss
ERPs (F,1). This effect appears to have been driven by a
larger negativity of Win ERPs in negative expectation contexts.
The same pattern was also obtained with mean amplitudes and
peak-to-peak amplitudes, where we found a significant effect of
EVal for Win feedbacks in both measures (Fs.5.9, ps,.02),
whereas this effect was not significant for Loss feedbacks
(Fs,3.2, ps..09). Although descriptive statistics from peak-to-
peak analyses suggest that FRNs to negative outcomes appear to
be larger in positive compared to negative expectation contexts,
we found that this difference was not formally reliable (p = .09),
whereas the converse effect (larger FRNs for Win ERPs in
negative expectation contexts) was clearly significant (p = .02). A
more fine-grained block-by-block examination of these results
suggests that win ERPs were sensitive to both WD-LD and PL-
PW contrasts whereas Loss ERPs were sensitive to WD-LD but
not PL-PW (see Figure S7). Relevant descriptive statistics are
depicted in Figure 3b and Figure S7. Overall, these results
suggest that variations in ERPs to positive feedbacks have
played a predominant role in our FRN results.
The significant modulation of ERPs to positive outcomes
suggests that an enhancement of FRN negativity for unexpected
positive outcomes might have attenuated the difference between
ERPs to negative and positive outcomes in PW and LD, which
could have contributed to the EVal X Feedback interaction. In
other words, the overall pattern of FRN results might have been
driven by an attenuation of Win-Loss FRN differences in
negative contexts, rather than by an enhancement in positive
contexts. In order to examine this question, we considered
neutral blocks as a baseline condition. Neutral blocks had a
50% reward probability that did not reflect a change from a
previous block as they were always following blocks with similar
reward probabilities (PW and PL). They had been inserted
purely to attenuate expectations about what blocks would follow
PL and PW blocks and thus were not initially included in the
data analysis design. However, they can be seen as a ‘‘baseline’’
block in which no a priori expectations can be assumed. If an
attenuation of FRN effects has taken place in negative contexts,
then the Loss-Win difference in the FRN time window should
be smaller in negative expectation contexts compared to both
positive expectation and neutral baseline blocks.
In order to test this prediction, we calculated peak-to-peak FRN
difference scores (Loss ERPs minus Win ERPs) for positive,
negative and neutral contexts and computed a one-way ANOVA
testing the effect of context (positive vs. negative vs. neutral) on
these difference scores. We found a significant main effect of
context (F(1.9,40.1) = 3.6, p = .04, g2 = .14), and pairwise compar-
isons revealed that the FRN difference score for negative contexts
was significantly smaller than both positive and neutral contexts
(ps,.05). In addition, no significant difference was found between
positive and neutral contexts (p = .90). Descriptive statistics for this
analysis are included in Figure S8. In order to further verify the
reliability of these effects, we observed that the effect of valence on
FRN activity was significant in neutral blocks using peak
amplitudes (F(1,21) = 8.5, p = .008, g2 = .29). The same effect was
obtained using peak to peak and mean amplitudes (Fs.6.4,
ps,.009). This effect is depicted in Figure 4. Finally, a Block (WD
vs. LD vs. PL vs. PW vs. Neutral) vs. Feedback (win vs. loss)
ANOVA revealed an interaction (F(2.3,47.9) = 3.4, p = .03,
g2 = .14) in the fronto-central cluster in which only PW and LD
had clearly non-significant effects of feedback (Fs,1.1, ps..31).
These findings suggest that our results were driven at least in part
by an attenuation of the effect of valence on the FRN in negative
expectation contexts, caused by a modulation of ERPs to positive
outcomes in these contexts.
P3
As shown in Figure 5, a larger positive peak is visible for Win
ERPs compared to Loss ERPs. Given that visible differences
around N200 could have driven onset differences biasing absolute
peak and mean amplitude measures of the P3, we focused these
analyses on peak-to-peak measures (see Methods section). We
found a significant main effect of Feedback (F(1,21) = 5.4, p = .03,
g2 = .20) showing that positive outcomes yielded overall larger
peaks than negative feedbacks, confirming our observations. We
also observed a complex 3-way interaction between Feedback,
EVal and EType (F(1,21) = 5.9, p = .02, g2 = .22). Subsidiary
analyses showed that this effect was driven by a Feedback X
EType interaction in negative expectation contexts (F(1,21) = 4.4,
p = .05, g2 = .17), indicating that the Feedback effect was
statistically more reliable in LD (F(1,21) = 7.1, p = .01, g2 = .25)
than in PW (F,1). Valence-specific analyses did not yield
significant effects of interest.
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Discussion
The main finding of this study is that a change per se in reward
probability relative to a previous environment can modulate the
Feedback-Related negativity. Specifically, a reliable distinction
between ERPs to negative and positive feedbacks in the FRN time
window was observed in the WD and PL conditions, but not in LD
and PW. This finding indicates that the evaluation of outcomes for
a given reward probability (50% in the cases of PL and PW) can be
different according to whether this probability reflects an increase
or a decrease in reward probability relative to a prior context. In
addition, valence-specific analyses suggested that variations in
ERPs to positive feedbacks have played a predominant role in
these effects. Further, we observed an overall effect of outcome
valence on the P3.
The key finding of this study is that a mere increase or decrease
in reward probability relative to a previous environment led to the
same pattern of FRN modulation as a manipulation of the actual
frequencies of rewards in the current environment. This finding is
consistent with our hypothesis that a relative change per se from
previous reward contingencies can constrain outcome monitoring
systems. This implication is supported by a vast body of research
indicating that the FRN is a neural index of outcome monitoring
systems [12,16] and by evidence indicating that the FRN is an
index of discrepancies between predictions and valenced outcomes
[25,55,56]. These findings are also consistent with previous data
showing that the FRN is sensitive to context manipulations
[10,55]. However, these studies had manipulated context through
the variation of the range of possible outcomes in a given
environment, or by the manipulation of beliefs about future
outcomes. The sensitivity of the FRN to changes per se
(improvement or worsening) relative to prior states of learned
reward contingencies remains largely unexplored.
Previous fMRI and animal model studies had shown that
changes relative to previous states of reward probability could
modulate how medial frontal systems respond to rewards and
punishments [57–59]. However, our findings that similar manip-
ulations can affect the FRN suggest that these effects can
potentially be explained by an account related to the monitoring
of deviations from reward expectancies. Specifically, our findings
suggest that movements upwards or downwards in reward
probability can be coded by brain monitoring systems and lead
to a ‘‘resetting’’ of predictions about what future outcomes are the
most and least likely to occur. Stated differently, a change per se in
reward probability can create a context that determines what
outcomes will be perceived as violations of established predictions
[7]. Specifically, the context in this case could be a representation
that the reward probability is increasing or decreasing, which in
turn determines which type of outcome is expected to occur most
frequently. Further research will be needed to investigate the
precise brain structures involved in the putative re-setting of
outcome predictions suggested by our findings. A significant
amount of evidence indicates a link between the Anterior
Cingulate Cortex (ACC) and the FRN [4,16,60] and between
the ACC and the monitoring of outcome-prediction discrepancies
[6,61,62]. However, fMRI studies that investigated relative
changes in reward environments revealed that a wider network
was involved in such effects, including ACC structures but also the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and subcortical areas [57–59]. In
addition, recent research suggests that the insula may also be
important for the detection of deviations from predictions, and for
how subsequent learning can be guided by these prediction errors
[8,63]. Future research will be needed to investigate whether the
effects of relative context changes on these areas can be accounted
for by differences in outcome prediction setting.
The present findings also provide evidence that can
contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between
the FRN and reward environments. The FRN is classically
operationalized as a difference between ERPs to negative and
positive outcomes in the N2 time window [64]. Our findings
that this difference between rewards and nonrewards is most
reliable in ‘‘positive’’ expectation contexts seems consistent with
the RL-ERN model according to which the FRN reflects a
negative RPE [4,24]. However, this conclusion needs to be
considered within the context of two additional findings in our
data. First, we found that the the interaction between Feedback
and Expectancy valence in our data was mainly due to
variations in ERPs to rewards rather than nonrewards. This
finding is consistent with previous studies showing that FRN
effects might be more related to neural activity related to
rewards rather than nonrewards [51,52,64]. Second, we found
that ERPs in the FRN time window were more negative-going
for unexpected positive outcomes (in blocks LD and PW)
compared to expected positive outcomes (in blocks WD and
PL). This finding does not fit with the RL-ERN account,
whereas it is consistent with the Predicted Response-Outcome
(PRO) model (6). The PRO model suggests that the FRN
reflects the activity of a system of detection of expectancy
deviations, regardless of whether these deviations are positive or
negative [31]. It has to be acknowledged that existing evidence
regarding the modulation of the FRN by positive feedbacks is
contradictory. Several studies report a reduced FRN (i.e. a
larger ERP positivity in the FRN time window) for unexpected
rewards (see [21] for a list of studies showing this result),
whereas other studies obtain results similar to ours [26–30].
There is to our knowledge no consensual explanation that
reconciles these contradictions, although several lines of thinking
have been put forward: First, it is possible that ERPs to positive
feedbacks in the FRN time window might reflect the overlap of
different ERP components [64]. Second, it has been suggested
that the motivational relevance of unexpected outcomes might,
in certain paradigms, be different according to the valence of
the outcome [28]. Therefore the salience of unexpected
outcomes might be different according to outcome valence,
which could explain why in many cases there is a valence X
unexpectedness interaction in FRN data. Third, it has also been
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Figure 5. Neutral condition ERPs. Averaged ERP waveforms
for theFeedback-Related  Negativity  (FRN)  plotting  ERPs  to  
Wins  and Losses in the neutral blocks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066350.g004
suggested that these contradictions might be due to systematic
methodological biases in the FRN literature [26]. More research
is necessary to explore these possibilities and resolve current
contradictions in the FRN literature.
Although we had no specific hypotheses about the Feedback-
related P3, we also examined this component to allow comparisons
with previous studies. We observed an overall effect of valence in
which ERPs to positive outcomes were more positive-going than
ERPs to negative outcomes. Further, a three-way interaction on
peak-to-peak measures suggested that this effect was more
statistically reliable in LD compared to PW blocks. The larger
positivities for Win rather than Loss feedbacks are consistent with
many previous studies [42,55,65]. The observation that this effect
was statistically stronger in LD than PW blocks could potentially
be consistent with previous reports that the P3 might be sensitive
to positive RPEs [66]. Both LD and PW are thought to be
environments where positive outcomes are unexpected, but
positive outcomes are more infrequent in LD than PW. Therefore,
it could also be tentatively inferred that the P3 is not sensitive to
relative contextual changes in reward probability. However, this
conclusion has to be drawn with caution, given that the literature
on the Feedback-related P3 has yielded many contradictory results
so far. For instance, some studies have found a more positive peak
for positive compared to negative feedbacks [67,68], whereas other
studies have found the opposite pattern [34,45,69,70], or have
found that valence does not modulate this component [12,65].
Next, evidence that the P3 is sensitive to unexpected positive
outcomes has been reported [71,72], but it has also been shown
that the P3 is sensitive to unexpected outcomes independently of
valence effects [55,71]. Finally, a few studies have reported that
the effect of valence on the P3 was most reliable when certain
types of outcomes were expected [42].
A potential explanation for these apparent contradictions is that
the Feedback-related P3 is modulated by multiple factors that have
yet to be thoroughly disentangled. In particular, the P300 complex
is known to be sensitive to attentional factors [73] that could be
intrinsically embedded in the paradigms used to investigate ERP
correlates of reward outcomes. For instance, attentional param-
eters at feedback delivery could potentially be determined by
variations in the type of choice, uncertainty and task demands of
the behavioural choice that precedes the feedback [45,74]. It could
also be linked to the specific expectations created by the
environment when feedbacks are delivered [66]. Future research
programmes will be necessary to better understand and control
attentional parameters involved in outcome monitoring to help
resolve current contradictions.
Finally, the findings reported in the present paper can
provide additional suggestions for future research. First, we
observed a cancellation of the effect of valence on FRN activity
in PW and LD blocks, which could appear surprising given the
robustness of Win-Loss FRN differences in the literature.
However, the absence of a differentiation between gains and
losses is not uncommon in the literature [34,75]. The reasons
that might lead to a cancellation rather than an attenuation of
the FRN effect are not easy to delineate, but at least two
explanations are possible: (1) In our experiment, expectations
were built up and consolidated over a relatively sustained period
of time (i.e. over many trials). Therefore it is possible that
nonrewards might have completely lost any meaning of
unexpectedness/prediction error. In other words, building
expectations over a sustained sequence of trials could lead to
very stable negative predictions. In such a scenario, negative
outcomes are unlikely to produce an RPE strong enough to
generate an FRN effect. (2) Another explanation is linked to our
findings that Win waveforms are strongly modulated by our
manipulation. In our data, Win waveforms tend to be more
negative-going when they are unexpected [27,28]. Therefore
win ERPs tend to go down to the same level of the Loss
waveforms in LD and PW, which could explain the final result
of an absence of Win-loss differentiation in those conditions.
Future research will be needed to investigate these ideas, and
more specifically (1) the effects of the stability of learned
expectations on FRN activity; and (2) the role of ERPs to
positive outcomes in general FRN effects. Second, we found no
evidence that our effects were different according to whether the
first or the second half of each block was considered (see Results
S4 and Figure S5). However, it is not excluded that temporal
differences might exist between shorter temporal stages within
each block. Such a detailed analysis was beyond the scope of
the current project, and not enough artifact-free trials were
available to follow this approach in the current dataset. A
possible methodological approach for future studies that might
want to explore the temporal modulation of FRN activity within
a block of trials could adopt a design with a substantially larger
number of blocks. This approach could allow one to obtain
enough artifact-free trials for a detailed separation of blocks into
very short temporal stages, although the effects of an overly
long experimental session on the results should be carefully
considered. Third, our findings show that a 50% reward
probability can lead to different FRN patterns according to the
reward probability encountered before the current environment.
However, future research will be needed to explore the extent
to which this phenomenon is independent from the absolute
values of reward probabilities involved. For instance, it remains
to be seen if a similar modulation of the FRN would be
obtained in a change taking place in context of losses (e.g. a
change from 5% to 30% of reward probability) compared to a
change within a context of gains (e.g. a change from 60% to
85%). Finally, our study suggests that context effects on
decision-making are adequately explained by reinforcement
learning models. However, it has been suggested that context
effects in real life decision-making might not be easily explained
by parsimonious learning models [8]. In order to tackle this
issue, it would be interesting to consider recent ecologically-valid
theoretical models of cognitive control and decision-making that
integrate social and phenomenal dimensions with reinforcement
learning principles. For instance, Ibanez & Manes [8] suggest
that a fronto-insular temporal network would be primarily
responsible for how behavioural choices can be constrained by
context, including social contexts. In addition, Singer et al., [63]
suggest that the insula plays a role in integrating experiential
information (‘‘predictive feelings’’) into the process of comparing
predicted outcomes with actual outcomes.
In conclusion, this study provides evidence that a mere change
relative to a prior state of reward contingencies can modulate the
electrophysiological distinction between negative and positive
outcomes in the FRN time window. This finding suggests that
sudden changes relative to prior reward contingencies can
constrain neural systems of outcome monitoring. Further, we also
found that this pattern of results appeared to be driven at least in
part by variations in ERPs to positive outcomes.These findings can
potentially contribute to a more mechanistic understanding of
emotional phenomena linked to sudden changes between
environments, such as negative outlooks caused by life events
[1,2] or the phenomenon of optimism [76]. In both cases, it could
be speculated that monitoring systems possibly located mainly in
the medial frontal cortex are coding the changes relative to prior
Effects of Reward Probability Changes on the FRN
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 June 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 6 | e66350
circumstances and accordingly re-setting predictions about future
events.
Data Access
In accordance with the policies of PLOS One, the data reported
in this article can be accessed upon request addressed to the
corresponding authors.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 FRN waveforms separated by prior choice.
Averaged ERP waveforms for the FRN plotting ERPs to Wins and
Losses separately for prior choice (risk; left, safe, right) and block
(PW; top, PL; bottom). Electrode data are taken from the midline
fronto-central cluster (MFC) as described in the methods section.
(PDF)
Figure S2 P3 waveforms separated by prior choice.
Averaged ERP waveforms from the midline parietal (MP) cluster
for the Feedback-related P3 plotting ERPs to Wins and Losses
separately for prior choice.
(PDF)
Figure S3 FRN for high and low-risk takers in objective
blocks. Averaged ERP waveforms from the MFC cluster for the
FRN plotting ERPs to Wins and Losses separately for high (left)
and low (right) risk-takers within the objective reward probability
blocks (WD; LD).
(PDF)
Figure S4 FRN for high and low-risk takers in subjec-
tive blocks. Averaged ERP waveforms from the MFC cluster for
the FRN plotting ERPs to Wins and Losses separately for high
(left) and low (right) risk-takers within the subjective reward
probability blocks (PW; top, PL; bottom).
(PDF)
Figure S5 FRN for early and late stages of blocks.
Averaged ERP waveforms from the MFC cluster for the FRN
plotting ERPs to Wins and Losses separately for early (top) and
late (bottom) stages within the PW (left) and PL (right) blocks.
(PDF)
Figure S6 P3 for early and late stages of blocks. Averaged
ERP waveforms for the P3 plotting ERPs to Wins and Losses
separately for early (top) and late (bottom) stages within the PW
(left) and PL (right) blocks from the Midline Parietal Cluster.
(PDF)
Figure S7 Valence specific contrasts. We used one-tailed t-
tests to examine if FRN activity was more negative for unexpected
rather than expected contexts. For Wins, both WD-LD and PL-
PW contrast were significant (ps #.05). For Losses, WD-LD was
significant (p,.05), but not PL-PW (t,1.0). We thank an
anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. However, these
results have to be considered with caution given that the EVal X
EType X Feedback was not significant.
(PDF)
Figure S8 Attenuation of FRN activity in negative
blocks. We examined the prediction that an attenuation of the
FRN might have taken place in negative expectancy contexts. We
compared the FRN amplitude, by subtracting Win ERPs from
Loss ERPs, in positive, negative and neutral blocks. A one-way
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of context [F(1.9,
39.6) = 4.9, p = .01, g2 = .19] and pairwise comparisons revealed
that the FRN difference score for negative contexts was
significantly smaller than both positive and neutral contexts
(ps,.05). In addition, no significant difference was found between
positive and neutral contexts (p..40).
(PDF)
Table S1 Frequency of choices across blocks.
(PDF)
Table S2 RTs for choices across blocks.
(PDF)
Table S3 Participant numbers for high risk vs. low risk
separation.
(PDF)
Results S1 Descriptive statistics for the behavioural
data.
(PDF)
Results S2 FRN and P3 analyses separated by preceding
choice (risky vs. safe).
(PDF)
Results S3 Individual differences in risk-taking.
(PDF)
Results S4 The effects of valence on the FRN by
different temporal stages.
(PDF)
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